

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THE

Case Re-stated;

OR AN

EXAMINE of a late PAMPHLET,

INTITLED,

The State of the Nation for the Year 1747, &c.

Wherein the Disingenuity, and secret Views of the AUTHOR are exposed, and the Conduct of the present ADMINISTRATION explained and justified.

In a LETTER to a FRIEND.

Timeo Danaos, et dona ferentes.

LONDON:

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THE

Caſe Re-ſtated, *&c.*

December 31, 1747.

My Dear Friend,

WHEN Men of your Capacity and Experience alarm themſelves about publick Affairs, on the Report of any puny Adept in Politicks, who, from his Garret, ſets up for a Cenſor of publick Meaſures, and Reformer of the State, it becomes the Friend to offer the faithful Hand towards leading from the Path of Illuſion. Nor does it leſs behove the true Patriot to ſtep forth, on ſuch Emergencies, and diſtinguiſh himſelf from thoſe, who, under fair Pretences, work to undermine the Government, and ruin the State.

Nothing can appear more evident, than that the Author of *The State of the Nation for the laſt Year*, the Work that has raiſed ſuch gloomy Ideas in your Mind, has had a View to diſtreſſing the State, in order to bring on ſome ſignal Convulſion, as neceſſary towards producing a Change in the Conſtitution; or, in the Words of a late extraordinary * Pamphlet, *of reſtoring the old Conſtitution.* Nothing is more certain than that this pretended Patriot, would bring upon us, in reality, all thoſe big impendent Evils which he ſuggeſts, and ſeemingly writes, to avert; for cautious and covered as he is, we find him, on Occaſions, expoſing the cloven Hoof, and betraying the deep Secrets of his Scheme.

After he had wrote a Book, perhaps the moſt licentious and ſeditious that has appeared in our Age; after he had given the Miniſtry the higheſt Provocation, and furniſhed them with the moſt colourable Pretext for attempting a Reſtraint of the Preſs; after, I ſay, this maſqued Patriot has done all in his Power to irritate and inflame, he puts his Readers in Mind that the Court is hatching a Scheme for ſubverting our Liberties.

* Apology for the Conduct of a late celebrated ſecond-rate Miniſter, &c.

' * I thought it proper to ſay ſo much, as ' it is part of the *State of the Nation* to un- ' derſtand our natural Rights, and to be ' guarded againſt a *Bill in Embryo*, projecting ' to deſtroy them : ſince it matters little ' that we have ſhewn what particular Affairs ' are tranſacting, when perhaps *one is in* ' *Agitation* of more Importance to our Wel- ' fare than all the reſt put together.'

A Man that apprehended an Intention to reſtrain the Preſs, and really wiſhed to prevent it, would write with Decency and Calmneſs; and if he found Fault with the Miniſterial Conduct, would ſpeak of Miniſters with Deference and good Manners. But he who would urge on every Meaſure for inflaming the Minds of the People, and ripening them for a Change, would uſe ſuch Means as ſhould appear more likely to hurry on the inflaming Meaſure he pretended to dread and explode. Thus are we told by the late Mr. *W——n* himſelf, or his Apologiſt, that in order to bring on, with the greater Certainty, a War with *Spain*, which would open a Way to that *old Conſtitution* he was ſo paſſionately fond of, he managed his Defence of the *Convention* ſo as to defeat, rather than promote the pacific Purpoſes of that Compact. ' And for this ' Reaſon,

* Page 63.

'Reaſon, ſays the Apologiſt, Page 45, tho' 'I was not at Liberty to oppoſe the *Con-* 'vention directly, I took care that my Juſti- 'fication of it ſhould rather inflame, than 'abate, the Feuds and Heats both within 'Doors and without; inſomuch that I may 'ſay, I had contributed as much to the '*Spaniſh* War, by my Manner of oppoſing 'it, as thoſe that had openly recom- 'mended it.'

This Legacy of Mr. *W——n*'s, whether his own or another's, has opened the Eyes of the Publick in regard to the *Sempronius*'s of the preſent Age; and it is to be hoped, for the future, they will be watched and guarded againſt, as being more dangerous than thoſe whom we look upon as our hereditary Enemies. The *French* are at preſent our open Enemies, and as ſuch, I am for purſuing them to Deſtruction, as far as is conſiſtent with the real Intereſt of my Country; but I have no Notion of riſking the Welfare of dear *England* out of Reſentment to *France*, becauſe I have been taught to hate *Frenchmen* as our hereditary Enemies.

This hereditary Animoſity our Author builds upon for declaiming *Engliſhmen* to a diſreliſh for Peace, tho' there be no Proſpect of Succeſs by a Continuance of the War.

But

But this Writer, like that of *Faction detected*, knew the Exceſs of our Propenſity to hate the *French*, and thinks to play the ſame Game, by Aid of that national Weakneſs, with equal Succeſs.

The Author of *Faction detected*, lured us to provoke *France*, I may ſay wantonly and injudiciouſly, to declare War againſt theſe Kingdoms; and the Author of *the State of the Nation* attempts to lure us, in his Turn, to a Continuance of that War, againſt all the obvious Lights of Reaſon and Experience. Are not the Schemes of both theſe Writers founded on ſimilar Plans? Does not the latter, who urges the Increaſe of our Debts and Taxes beyond our Strength, to proſecute an inauſpicious War; does not the former, who wrote us into too good an Opinion of our own Force, and too mean a one of that of *France*; do not theſe Declaimers, I ſay, work upon ſimilar Plans? And what other can this Plan be except that of Mr. *W———n*'s, wherein he recommends the following paſſive Conduct to all ſuch as wiſh well to his beloved *old Conſtitution.*

* 'Let all who are fond of *War*, and 'Parades on the *Continent*, be indulged. 'Let all who would maintain a large ſtand-'ing Corps of *cheriſhed foreign Mercenaries*, 'have

* Apology, Page 49.

' have their Way. Let thoſe who would ' increaſe our Debts, be pleaſed. And let ' *thoſe who would prolong the War*, to increaſe ' theſe Pledges, and for a Pretext to continue ' the aforeſaid *Mercenaries* in our Pay, be ' praiſed and ſupported. In ſhort, let all ' who would impoveriſh the People, in or- ' der to humble them; and corrupt them, ' in order to efface all generous Notions of ' Poſterity, and their Country, out of their ' Breaſts; let thoſe, I ſay, have Rope ' enough, and they will better anſwer our ' Purpoſe than *France*, even if ſhe were ſin- ' cere and inclined to ſerve us.'

Who, in his Senſes, can argue againſt the Rectitude of Mr. *W———n*'s Scheme? 'Tis founded on Maxims ſelf-evident and uncontrovertible. If People are forced upon an unhopeful Attempt, are obliged to purſue ill Succeſs, and have their Burden augmented in order to continue ſuch Purſuit, muſt not the Conſequences be Diſcontent, Sedition and Diſaffection, which generally grow up to Convulſions, and often to an entire Change of Government? And who, that allows himſelf Time to reflect in the leaſt, can diſ-believe that the Views of this Author, who has transformed himſelf into various Shapes, the better to impoſe and deceive, are the ſame with thoſe eſtabliſhed by the Apologiſt and his Brother *Proteus*, the Author of *Faction detected?*

This

This latter, as the other two, cloathed himſelf with *Whiggiſh* Principles, as moſt likely to anſwer his Purpoſe of Deception, though his whole Scheme was moſt notoriouſly built on Maxims diametrically repugnant. And to gloſs over his Deception, he ſets out with this pompous but dangerous Propoſition. 'The Criterion of a *Whig* 'Conduct is to reſiſt and reduce the Power of 'France.' On this Baſis was the Syſtem of that voluminous Writer built, and on the like has the preſent Writer raiſed all his Engines for unhinging our preſent happy Eſtabliſhment.

France, with him, is to have no Peace, let her ſue never ſo humbly for it, till ſhe is conquered and undone.—'It was a Maxim 'among the old *Romans*, ſays he, never to 'leave an Enemy unconquered.' But that we may be the more animated to indulge to the national Enmity to *France*, he ſets before us the Examples of our wiſeſt Monarchs, as he miſcalls all thoſe, who, to ſubdue the *French*, had well nigh ruined the *Engliſh*. * 'In the time of our *Edward* III. Uniformity of Action appeared in its full Spirit 'and Splendor, this at once animated our 'Councils, and gave Vigour to our Arms. 'The ſame Prince that headed the Army,

* Page 28.

'ruled in the Cabinet: *Nor has there been a 'Sovereign, from the Time of this* Edward *to 'that of* Elizabeth *of immortal Memory, but 'what looked on the Court of* France *as their 'ENEMY, and always so treated it.* After 'which a long Interval furnishes us at 'once with different Politicks, and less 'glorious Monarchs, till *William* III. like 'another good Angel, appeared to redeem 'our past Follies, to recover our lost Com-'merce, and to inspire us with a just Sense 'of the imminent Danger attending us, by 'being in Friendship with *France.*'

You will necessarily observe a String of tacit Reflection on our present Monarch for not heading our Army, and Inaccuracies, or rather Inconsistencies, pompously blended together, and ornamented with the Sanction of some of our most revered old Kings, purposely to impose on the too good Nature of *Englishmen*, who are taught, from the Cradle, to boast a Hatred to the *French*. Had not this inaccurate Writer built too strongly on our *Prejudice* to that Nation, he would not have set such Examples before his Readers, as ought, in reality, to raise their Indignation against him. Is there one ever so little read in our Annals, that knows not that the Ambition, or rather, the Enmity of our *Edwards* and *Henries* to *France*, had vainly cost this Nation an Ocean of Blood

and

and Treaſure. And how much more of both we ſpent in latter Days, to indulge to our natural *Prejudices*, I leave this Author to calculate.

But upon what Grounds do theſe maſked *Whigs* raiſe their Propoſition, *that the Criterion of a Whig Conduct is to reſiſt and reduce the Power of France?* Would *Whigs* undertake the Reduction of *France* without any Proſpect of Succeſs? Would they deſtroy *England* in a fruitleſs Attempt of reducing *France?* Such cannot be the Policy of *Whigs*, unleſs of ſuch *Whigs* as the *Apologiſt* paints out all our Stateſmen ſince the Revolution to have been. But that a Name I venerate, as much as I do that of *Whig* in its genuine, primitive Meaning, may no longer ſuffer by Pretenders and *falſe Brethren*, I beg leave to deny this Propoſition to be true, for the following few Reaſons, among a thouſand, that might be inſtanced.

The *Whigs* in *Charles* II. Reign, perſecuted the Earl of *Danby*, afterwards Duke of *Leeds*, and principal Promoter of the Revolution, and would have brought him to the Block, tho' it was notorious that he was an Enemy to *France*, and had obſtructed all her Machinations at our Court, while he had any Influence there, as appeared by the

Meaſures purſued as ſoon as he was obliged to retire.

In King *William*'s Reign, the *Whigs* indicated no innate Averſion to *France*, when they could adviſe and conduct the *Partition Treaties*, which, in their Conſequences, gave *Spain* and the *Indies* to the Houſe of *Bourbon*, and for which theſe *Whiggiſh* Counſellors and Negociators were afterwards impeached by a rank *Tory* Houſe of Commons, an amphibious Generation that brags of Principles and have none. There is no denying, that the obvious Meaning of the *Partition Treaty* was increaſing the Power of *France*; and ſuch were its direct Conſequences; nor can it be leſs denied that it had been propoſed, negociated, and concluded by *Whigs* Abroad; defended, maintained, and applauded in Parliament by *Whigs* at Home; ſo that *reſiſting* and *reducing* the Power of *France* was not always *the Criterion of a Whig Conduct*.

But to bring the Point Home to our preſent *Whigs*, who are not, it is to be hoped, leſs *Whigs* than their Anceſtors, nor of the late Mr. *W*————*n*'s Complexion, I ſhall appeal to the Conduct of the preſent Adminiſtration all the late Reign, and moſt of the preſent, and I aſſure myſelf that it will be admitted the Miniſtry all the while were of the

the true old *Whiggiſh* Standard. It is notorious, that an almoſt implicit Confidence was repoſed by our Court in *France* ever ſince the Acceſſion, till the Death of the Emperor *Charles* VI. a Period of near *thirty Years*. During all that long Period, this Doctrine now laid down as fundamental, was ridiculed and hooted at in our moſt Auguſt Aſſemblies, and a new *Credendum* ſubſtituted in its room, *viz.* Believe in *France*, and Suſpect the Houſe of *Auſtria*; pull down the latter, and aggrandize the former. And, Sir, ſhould you have forgot that the long Oppoſition of the few grumbling *Tories* in Parliament, was founded on the Adminiſtration's conſtant Adherence to this Doctrine, I beg you will, to juſtify me and ſatisfy yourſelf, conſult Monſ. *Rouſſet*'s Collections, ſo revered, and often appealed to, by the Author of *Faction detected*.

In order to juſtify this new-fangled Doctrine, of hunting down *France* at all Hazard and Expence, it is laid down as a *poſtulatum*, that the *French* are our natural and implacable Enemies, tho' this be a Principle which that Nation conſtantly and abſolutely diſavow and deny. And, indeed, one need not wonder at this ſo peremptory a Diſavowal, if it be conſidered how extravagant, feroce, unnatural, impious a Principle that of an unrelenting Hatred is; how repugnant

pugnant to the Law of Nature and Nations, not to name that of the Goſpel, which I am ſorry to ſee ſo little venerated of late.

Now whether the *French* do or do not merit the Character, I ſhall not take upon me to determine at preſent; but this I am very clear in, that they are extremely prudent in diſclaiming it, and that this wiſe Conduct of theirs has been, in ſeveral critical Conjunctures, of mighty uſe to them. Why then, ſince it is not unlawful to learn even from Enemies, do we not follow the wiſe Conduct of the *French* in this reſpect, rather than juſtify that implacable Hatred with which we charge them, by avowing it to be the ruling Principle of our own Conduct? May not Foreigners juſtly retort upon us, whenever we call upon them to aſſiſt towards reducing and humbling *France*, 'Whatever comes from you of this Kind 'deſerves to be ſuſpected; you avow your-'ſelves to be the conſtant, unalterable Ene-'mies of that Power, and therefore we 'may doubt, that you mean rather the Gra-'tification of your *Prejudice*, than the 'Security of our Freedom and Intereſts?' And I am not ſure but the Weakneſs of the preſent Confederacy againſt *France*, is more owing to the Opinion which Foreigners entertain of our *falſe Prejudice* to that Crown, than to either the Gold, or ſuperior

Politicks

Politicks of the *French* Cabinet. Behold how calmly all the Powers of *Germany*, the Houſe of *Auſtria* excepted, the *Dane*, the *Swede*, in ſhort all the Powers of *Europe*, except *Ruſſia*, which may be lured by the Charms of our *Guineas*, to move, or ſeem to move, to our Aid; ſee, I ſay, how compoſed and ſerene all *Europe* look on, while this hated Power puſhes her Conqueſts almoſt to the Heart of *Holland*.

There can poſſibly be but three Reaſons aſſigned for the general Inattention of the Powers on the Continent to the late Rapidity of *French* Conqueſts, *viz.* That they conceive the *Ballance of Power* to be in no Danger, that Phantom which turned ſo many Heads in *England* ſince the Revolution; or that they ſuppoſe the Intereſt of *H——r* more conſulted, and more nearly concerned, than that of *England*, in the Commencement and Conſequences of the preſent War; or, laſtly, that theſe Powers, conſcious of our avowed *Prejudice* to *France*, ſeem not in an Humour to indulge to our national Weakneſs.

May it not be ſuppoſed that theſe neutral Powers had obſerved this *Prejudice*, or the Intereſt of *H——r* ſtrongly operating, when we wantonly plunged ourſelves into the War, and induſtriouſly brought it Home to the

Dutch?

Dutch? They might obſerve us tranſporting a large Body of Troops to the Continent, againſt the Opinion of thoſe next expoſed to the Power of *France*. They might likewiſe ſee us marching the ſame Troops beyond the Main, to draw the *French* out of *Auſtria*, *Bavaria*, and *Bohemia*, where they were *interring* the Flower of their Forces, and *ſinking* their cleareſt and beſt Revenues. They might behold us, after the miraculous Eſcape at *Dettingen*, rejecting a Peace which would have reſtrained *France*, and prevented her ulterior Conqueſts, reconciled the Empire, ſecured the *Dutch* Barrier, and produced general Safety and Tranquillity. Such muſt have been the neceſſary Conſequences of the Peace we rejected at *Hanau* in 1743; and ſo obvious were they to all *Europe*, that 'tis no Wonder none of the neighbouring Powers have ever ſince interfered either to join us, or compoſe the Quarrel.

All theſe capital Errors, Errors that have run us already *thirty Millions* in Debt, that have loſt all the *Anſtrian Netherlands*, and almoſt undone the *Dutch*, were owing either to a ſtrong *Prejudice* to *France*, or in *favour* of *H——r*. Take it which way one will, it was unreaſonable and unwarrantable; yet ſee how partially the maſked *Scribe* I am conſidering, buries in Oblivion all

all the Errors of the *Miniſter* who preſided in the Cabinet while thoſe fatal Miſtakes were committed, to traduce theſe Miniſters who had no hand in thoſe big Evils, and are ſuppoſed to be inclined to put the beſt and ſpeedieſt End they can to an unſucceſsful War.

* 'The Reader will readily perceive that 'I am here talking in Metaphor, and that 'I mean by the Nation, thoſe who take 'upon themſelves to govern, in Conſe-'quences of a Kind of *Self-Creation*, which 'at once gave them being, and conſtituted 'them a M————y. Theſe are the Men 'from whom I propoſe to ſweat off all '*Errors* and *Malignancy*, and by reſtoring 'them to a *right State of Judgment* give 'them *Honour*, and the Nation a well-'conſidered Peace.'—Juſt before this ſweating Paragraph, the Author plumes himſelf on having obſerved in his *State of the Nation* for the preceding Year 1746, that the preſent Miniſtry found Affairs in a proſperous Condition.

† 'The Pretence of Miniſters, who *force 'themſelves into Power*, was next conſidered, 'who found *Affairs in a fine Train of Succeſs*, 'but by their *ill Conduct threw them into 'Confuſion.*'

C But

* Page 1. † Page 8, of the Introduction.

But it seems this shrewd Censor, not content to tells us that he would sweat and purge the present Ministry, who, he says, ruined our flourishing Affairs by their ill Conduct, he charges them in direct Terms, in his *Almanack* of last Year, with being *Enemies* to the Nation. * 'I conceive those to be 'Enemies to the State who undertake Posts 'they are *incapable* of executing, that squander away the *publick Money*, or employ 'People in the Service who are only fit for 'Places as being their Friends.'

I should quite tire you with Quotations from this *Granvellian* Champion, if I had inserted a Tythe of his abusive Invectives against the present great Men in the Direction of our Affairs. With him, they are Fools, Madmen, and Enemies to their Country; and for what? for not reducing *France*, when they were forced to take up a losing Game, and for judging it more eligible to obtain the best Peace that can be had, than prosecute an unsuccessful War, against all the Lights of Reason and Experience, and the most stated Maxims of Prudence.

Yet, Sir, see what Sort of Peace this Monitor insists we shall obtain, against all those

* Page 5. of *State of the Nation* for 1746.

thoſe Lights of Reaſon and Prudence, which evidently point out to us a Diſcontinuance of the War when there are no Hopes of its becoming ſucceſsful.

* ‘ A Peace as firm and laſting as glorious ‘ and beneficial ; not productive of new ‘ War, nor making Peace and War equally ‘ expenſive to us ; not keeping us always in ‘ Terror, and upon our Guard ; not fearing ‘ Invaſions, nor dreading internal Enemies : ‘ But a Peace that muſt make the *French* ‘ perpetually *dependent upon us*, that will ‘ cure them for ever of ſetting the World in ‘ a Flame, and make them as much the ‘ Contempt, as they are now the Dread of ‘ their Neighbours.’—Again, ‘ The Nation ‘ expects it done, (ſuch a Peace as he Dic- ‘ tates above) they want not a Peace by ‘ Negociation, but by Arms ; a Peace ‘ that will execute itſelf and be perpetual.’

If you had not known the paſt ill Succeſs of our Arms, and the preſent Imminency of the Danger of our beſt and powerfulleſt Allies, would you not conclude, on the viewing ſo imperious a Mandate to our Miniſtry as the above, that our national Troops had taken up their Winter Quarters in the *Iſle of France*, that *Paris* was already in our Hands, and *Verſailles* the Head

* Page 31.

Quarters of our Royal Leader ?——*A Peace that muſt make* France *perpetually dependent upon us.*—*Such a Peace the Nation expects.*——*But it muſt be obtained by the Sword, not by the Pen.*———Pray, Sir, what do you think now of an Author that had ſo dreadfully alarmed your Fears? Can you reflect on the gloomy Proſpect of our Affairs, and conſider this dictating Politician as a true Friend to the Cauſe and Royal Family he pretends to ſerve? Is not the Maſk lifted up high enough here to expoſe to your View the Incendiary and concealed J——e? Need you a more pregnant Proof that this *clubb'd* Performance, and ſuch I have Reaſons for believing it to be, comes from a Partizan of *France* on one hand, and on the other, from a ſecret Friend to Mr. *W——n*'s *old Conſtitution?*

You may poſſibly be able to gueſs, tho' I ſhould be in an Error, who the *French* Partizan can be, by the pompous, but unmeaning Detail of the Election for the City of *L——n*, in which eight whole Pages (from Page 35 to 44) are employed to let the World know that a certain M———t was too hard for the *Aldermen*, whether by direct or *indirect* Means is another Queſtion; and that * 'The City of *London* has 'always been conſidered of diſtinguiſhed 'Weight,

* Page 43.

' Weight, and I hope will prove ſo in the ' Houſe *by the Value of her Repreſentatives*, ' which have never been *equalled in my Time*, ' *as being all Men of Senſe*, undevoted to ' any Faction.'

I hope, that not only the City of *London*, but all our Cities and Boroughs are repreſented by Men of *Senſe* and Integrity, *free from all Prejudices in favour of any foreign Country, from whence they might be originally derived*; but let the Suppoſition be never ſo ſtrong in favour of their Parts and Probity, I cannot ſee why either the Election of *L——n*, or the Merit of the preſent Repreſentatives, are hawled into this Work, unleſs it was, that *one* of our Authors, perhaps not in ſuch Opulence as the *other*, had made this Puſh for opening the *Purſe* of his *Chum*, by offering him the fulſome Incenſe of a *Pen*, which diurnally Plays the *Fool* for B——d.

And now, Sir, that I have laid my Thumb upon my *Men*, I hope you will be of Opinion that you had unneceſſarily admitted of an Embarraſſment of Mind, which I am endeavouring to remove. You may perceive by the Work, which is obviouſly ſwelled out to an *Eighteen Pennyworth* for the main Purpoſe of *Gain*, that the Authors are in no Secrets of State, and are of no

Weight

Weight or Conſequence. You may obſerve that *one* puſhes to be taken Notice of by thoſe he *rails* at, and the other to be taken Notice of by his *Colleague*.

Such are the *Duumviri* that aſſume preſcribing to the Court and Miniſtry, and that put you in a Panick by inſinuating, that our Governors were willing to make *Peace* without hazarding the Continuance of a ſucceſsleſs War, in order *to beat France into an entire Dependance on this Nation*. The *firſt* in the high Commiſſion, draws his own Portrait tacitly in the flattering Encomiums beſtowed on the *French* for the *uniform and judicious Conduct of their* PRINCES AND MINISTERS, which are enforced by the Tranſlation of part of a pompous Declamation ſpoken by M. *Pavillon*, on his being admitted a Member of the Academy of Sciences at *Paris*, in the Reign of *Lewis* XIV. I wiſh we *Engliſh* were as national as the *French*; but we too early and eaſily forget the Source we are ſprung from, whereas others retain the *patrial Leven* for more Generations than one.

And could I ſuppoſe you, by this Time, at any Loſs concerning the aſſociate *Scribe*, I would direct you to the *Plain Reaſoner* in 1745, the *State of the Nation* in 1746, and the *G——r*, ſix Days in the Week. But he ſhines ſo much *like himſelf* in this doughty Performance, that I ſhould think it impoſſible for

for you to miſtake him. In the firſt you may find him calling *the Nation Beetles for not ſeeing that the Revenues of* France *are leſs than ours*; *for not looking on* France *at beſt but as a Bugbear that frightens weak Spirits*; *and for not believing* that, to flounce deeper in the Mire is the Way to get out of it, or to increaſe one's Burden is the ſureſt Way to get rid of it; or, to uſe the *Reaſoner*'s own immediate and more pertinent Expreſſion, *That the Increaſe of our publick Debts, is the moſt probable, if not the only Means of leſſening our Taxes.*

But I had unwarily like to have wronged our Author of the very Flower of all his wiſe Reflections, which is, * 'that it is 'better for us to be *one hundred Millions* in 'Debt than *Fifty*.' After this, I hope you will harbour a better Opinion of your own Judgment, than to take this Writer's frothy Declamations and Reveries for Oratory and Reaſoning. You may perceive that the Conjurer is no better a Prophet than he is a Calculator, tho' he plumes himſelf, in the very firſt Page of his political Almanack of this Year, for the Rectitude of his Calculations, and having foretold the Year before, all that happened in the preſent.

'Before the State of the Nation is entered 'upon for the current Year, it may be ex-'tremely neceſſary to form a brief Recapi-'tulation

* *Plain Reaſoner*, Page 23.

' tulation of what we remarked under the ' ſame Title the laſt Year, not only as it ' will have a natural Connection with the ' enſuing, but will at the ſame time *evince* ' *the Impartiality of our Views*, the *Veracity* ' *of our Aſſertions*, and *the Effect of our Con-* ' *jectures.*'

After ſo pompous a Portraiture of his own Sufficiency, one might expect he would have produced ſome Teſts of the Superiority of his ſcientific Faculties; and to do the *modeſt Man* Juſtice, he attempts ſomething like it; but unhappily he miſtakes for Proofs in his favour, ſuch as moſt obviouſly make againſt him. On caſting your Eye over his *State of the Nation* for laſt Year, you will find infinite Proof of the Truth of this Aſſertion, and particularly Page 50, 51, 52, and 21, from whence I beg leave to borrow a few Extracts for your preſent Satiſfaction.

' The Troops of our Allies are at leaſt ' *equal* to thoſe of *France*, and at preſent ' on the *gaining Side*. If any new Ally ' ſtarts up for *France* againſt the Court of ' *Vienna*, the late Treaty with *Ruſſia* will ' fully ballance it; ſo that it does not any ' where appear by what Means the *French* ' Court can *extricate themſelves out of their* ' *preſent Difficulties*, by bringing into the ' Field, in the South of *France*, an equal ' Number of diſciplin'd Troops, as are

' already

'already there of the Allies; nor find any 'Ally capable of doing her any important Service. *The Event in the Eye of Common Senſe, is very clear.* France *muſt be ſoon ruined and exhauſted, both by Sea and Land*, except ſhe can find Means to conquer, which, at leaſt, *is not very probable*, either in the *Low-Countries*, or in South *France*.—*Spain* may be *loſt to her ſoon*, and then the very Baſis of her Support falls of courſe.—As to the revolting State of *Genoa*, tho' it may require ſome Time to clear up, has no very favourable Aſpect towards the Houſe of *Bourbon*, but rather ſeems *on the Point of eminent Deſtruction*.——The Soldiers on our Part, and for ought I can ſee, *the Generals too*, as full as good as the *French*; our Succeſs on the Side of *Provence*, probably a Ballance for the Loſs of the *Low-Countries*.—There is the beſt Appearance, that our Army in the *Low-Countries*, this Year, will be a *Match* for the *French*.—And as the Affairs of *Europe* in general are in a very *hopeful* Way, by the *happy Progreſs* of the Arms of the Allies on the Side of South *France*, I ſhould not in the leaſt doubt, that when his *Royal Highneſs the Duke*, ſhall be appointed to command again in *Flanders*, but that we ſhall have a *pleaſant. Proſpect* on that Side.'——Then as for his Exactitude in Matter of Figures

and national Expence, you ſhall find him miſtaken in little more than a *ſingle Million* in his Calculation of the Money granted for the Expence of the preſent Year.

You cannot hence, Sir, avoid perceiving the Unfitneſs of ſo looſe a Calculator and Dabler in Politics, for the high Privilege he arrogates of alarming a Nation, dictating to a Court, and *ſweating* a Miniſtry.—— * ‘ The Way to give Health and Vigour to ‘ the State, is the ſame, as to cure malig- ‘ nant Diſorders in the human Body, that ‘ is to ſay, by *Sudorifics* and *Perſpiration*:— ‘ In this Manner I propoſe to treat the Body ‘ Politic *annually*, until all its groſs Humours ‘ evaporate.’—You ſee you are to be plagued annually with the Empirick's Preſcriptions, unleſs he is taken down in Charity to the Public. For want of this Precaution the laſt Year, we are troubled with him at preſent. But as the late Sir *Richard Steele* had heretofore ſilenced *Partrige* by expoſing his Impoſtor, ſo it is to be hoped his Brother Graduate may hereafter be ſtruck dumb by being thus ſtript of thoſe ſpecious, patriot Trappings with which he covered himſelf the better to impoſe on the Credulity of the People for the Promotion of his Scheme, in favour of Mr. *W*————*n*'s cheriſhed *old Conſtitution*. Even in regard to this Scribe, we know by Experience that he

* Page 1.

he mends by Correction, or at leaſt dares not offend, after Conviction, *in propria perſona*. For being detected, about three Years ago, by an able Pen *, he never after pretended to appear a *Reaſoner*, chuſing to cover himſelf under another Appellation.

'Tis probable, tho' we ſhould beat him out of his preſent *Title*, this Author will aſſume another the next Year; for the Man wants not for a modeſt Aſſurance, as you may judge by his exulting in his Lucubration of this Year, for the Exactitude of his Calculations, Obſervations, and Predictions in his laſt.

There is ſomething very peculiar in the Conſtruction of this Writer's Mind, which one ſhall not often meet with among *Engliſhmen*, and which would incline me to ſuſpect that ſome *Foreigner*, or *Spawn* of a Foreigner, may be not only his *Inſtigator*, but *Coadjutor* likewiſe, in his reiterated Attempts to impoſe upon the Public. He has gone on from Winter to Winter for three Years paſt, promiſing Wonders, and ſecuring no Succeſs; and yet tho' our Affairs grow every Day more deſperate, or at leaſt, are in as unthriving a Way as ever, this intrepid Scribe goes on preſcribing the ſame Doſe to us, which we experimentally found to be noxious and

 unwholſome,

* Plain Anſwer to the Plain Reaſoner.

unwholſome. *Faction detected*, from whence this Writer probably may have taken the Hint he annually purſues, aſſured us of beating *France* in a Campaign; next Year comes out the *Plain Reaſoner*, who gives the like Aſſurances with as little Reality; then appears the *State of the Nation* of laſt Year, repeating the ſame Aſſeverations, and with as little Foundation; and yet in the preſent Year, we are ſtill told we ſhall bang *France*, by a Continuance of the War, tho' full four Years Experience, one would think, ought to make us wiſer than to take his Word, and him more modeſt than to offer it.

There is ſo great Petulancy, not to ſay Arrogancy, in thus perſevering to impoſe upon the Publick, after being ſo often detected, and in the wrong, that one may very ſpeciouſly be allowed to preſume that ſome *pert* Foreigner or his *Offspring*, eggs on this Writer, and clubs with him in the Labour. The Politics of *France* are known to be too refined for the groſs Underſtandings of the Majority of *Engliſhmen*. *Sempronius*, is repreſented, by Mr. *Addiſon*, bellowing moſt in favour of Liberty and the Commonwealth, when he was deepeſt in the Intereſt of *Cæſar*. And I don't find, if the late Mr. *W———n* may be credited, but part of our People may match even the *French* for Art and Diſſimulation.

But

But to have Recourſe only to the Work before us for the Proof of the Depth of *Engliſh* Policy, ſee how furiouſly this Author mouths at *France*, proclaims her Inability, and promiſes her Reduction, when ſhe is on the Verge of ſubjecting *Holland*, of kindling a third ſucceſsful Flame in *Italy*, and of rendering ineffectual all our Efforts to ſtrengthen ourſelves, by a Corps of *Ruſſian* Auxiliaries, and by engaging the *Germanic* Body in our Cauſe. Muſt we not deem an Author uncommonly adroit that can perſuade us he is in earneſt all the while that he is ſpiriting up the Nation to purſue an, unequal, unſucceſsful Conflict? If, before *France* had won an Inch of the *Auſtrian Netherlands*, ſhe was able to baffle and beat us, what View can we have of Succeſs againſt her in the preſent flouriſhing Situation of her Affairs on the Continent?

But we are told by this adventurous Monitor, that her Succeſſes in the *Netherlands* go for nothing, inaſmuch as we ſhall be able to ruin her, in one Summer, by Sea, then get all her Trade, which he admits to be more lucrative than ours, and ſo make ourſelves whole at once for all our Expences ſince the Revolution, by adding the profitable Trade of *France* to our own.

As extraordinary as this Scheme for reducing *France* may appear to you, there is nothing plainer under the Sun than that ſuch is the purport of all this Writer's preſent incoherent Lucubration, if a Work, which has neither Order, Connexion nor reaſoning, may be ſaid to have any Meaning at all. You will find the Work a whole, compoſed of Parts as little relative to each other, as they are altogether to the Deſign of the Performance, which may be ſuppoſed to have been the giving a general Idea of the State of our Affairs. But how is this attempted to be performed by the Author, by jumbling together ſeveral detached Subjects, moſt of them quite foreign to the main Deſign, in ſo disjointed a Manner, that the firſt Part of the Work may as well be the latter; and either, or both, the Middle.

The Writer had catched the Itch of dabling in Politicks, would write to get a Penny, to alarm the People, to anſwer the ſecret Purpoſes of his maſked *Party*, to blacken and diſtreſs the preſent Miniſtry, and to reſtore a late fallen Miniſter. In ſuch a Flow of different Ideas, what could a weak Brain do elſe but ſtuff into his Work all the good Things he had heard or read of, whether pertinent or otherwiſe?

Thus may we account for the Detail (Page 24.) of the Chancellor of the *Ex——r*'s Method

Method of aſcertaining the *Quantum* of the current Supplies, and the manner of raiſing them. So likewiſe may be accounted for the whole tedious Progreſs of the late Election for *L——n*, and particularly his outdoing, Page 39, where he preſents his Reader with the choice Noſegay of a Simile, which, for its Beauty and Pertinence, may be as well the Offspring of the Laureat as the F—l. ‘ If any one has ſeen a young Girl ‘ diſappointed of her Huſband the Moment ‘ the Prieſt was going to join their Hands, ‘ ſo now looked Courtier at Courtier, Cor- ‘ poration-Man at Corporation-Man.’—— And what was it that had wrought this wonderful Surprize in Corporation-Men and Courtiers? *The ſudden Appearance of two potent Adverſaries that had been hid behind the Curtain*, as he tells in the ſame Page, which were *Sl—y B——ll* and *St—n Th——e J—n*, Eſqrs.—'Tis poſſible, that the Sight of two Gentlemen of ſo very great Importance may have ſcared timid Courtiers and Corporation-Men out of their Senſes; but how a longing poor young Girl could be *diſappointed of* HER *Husband before ſhe had one*, is what ſome future *G—z—r* may clear up, if the learned Author be in an Humour to vindicate an *intimate Acquaintance*.

The Author himſelf beſt knows with what View he has ſpent ſo much of his Ink,

Ink, and filled ſo many Pages of his Work, to ſhew us, that he had read the Treaty of *Munſter* had been concluded in 1648, that of the *Pyrenees* in 1659, that of *Nimeguen* in 1679, and the Peace of *Ryſwick* in 1697, and to give us a juſt Idea of his Accuracy, he deſcends to be ſo minute as to inform his illiterate Readers, that this laſt Treaty was concluded in the Month of *September*. He had finiſhed the Portraiture of his *Exactitude*, if he had inſerted the Day of the Month and *Hour* of the Day; but *Homer* himſelf nodded ſometimes.

Nor are we to wonder if one ſo much more intent to frighten and deceive, than to ſet right and inform, ſhould interlard his Work with ſuch Scraps of Hiſtory and Hearſay, as might ſet his Readers a ſtaring, and in their Surprize, forget or overlook the main Drift of his Undertaking, which was to over-load and perplex the Nation by the Continuance of an unſucceſsful War, the better to reſtore the late Mr. *W————n's Old Conſtitution.*

Behold how judiciouſly, Page 34, he blends the *Dutch* with the *Miniſtry* in a ſtrong Oppoſition to the H——r A——t, or, as he more elegantly phraſes it, *that riſing Genius of the Nation.* But being one of thoſe accurate Scribes that never diſhes up a *What* to their Readers without a *Wherefore*, he preſently acquaints us what had principally

principally occaſioned this *Coalition*. ‘ It ‘ was, he ſays, Page 35, the *ſtarting* up an ‘ antiquated Right in the Duchy of *Corn-* ‘ *wall*.’——But behold the Author's edifying Perſpicuity in developing his Subject, and clearing it up gradually to the Underſtanding of the meaneſt Capacity. Firſt, he *ſtarts* up a *Right* which puzzles the Reader to find out; and then preſently ſets his Mind at Quiet by informing him that, ‘ There ‘ was at this time produced to light ſome ‘ *old Records* of the Duchy, which ſeemed ‘ to give a Right to the Prince of *Wales*, as ‘ Duke of *Cornwall*, of convening any ‘ where, within the Limits of the Duchy, ‘ a Parliament of Tinners, to be continued ‘ together as long as their Principal, or his ‘ Deputy, by his Directions, ſhould think ‘ convenient.’

Here was Matter enough to alarm the Miniſtry and the *Dutch*, who might be overthrown, the latter by *Lewis* XV. and the former by the late Miniſter, ſhould the lack-learning *Cornwall* Parliament be permitted to ſit. ‘ This, to be ſure, at ſo de- ‘ licate a Criſis, alarmed the Miniſtry, and ‘ put them on uſing their beſt Endeavours ‘ to obviate ſo important an Oppoſition as ‘ ſuch a Ballance againſt them muſt have ‘ created.’

But this *Ballance* ſo exceedingly dreaded, as you ſhall ſee by and by, was, however,

in ſuch impartial Hands, as that it was not likely to prove any *Ballance* at all. 'It 'happened very luckily for them, that theſe 'Records were not in the Hands or Power 'of any of the Duchy Officers; they were 'in the Hands of an eminent Lawyer, un-'byaſſed to either Party, and to whom 'both made a very arduous Applicati-'on.'—It concerns not the Public, we will ſuppoſe, who the *unbyaſſed* Lawyer was, or how aptly the Epithet may be annexed to the Profeſſion of the Law, how he came by the Cuſtody of thoſe important *Records*, what Right he had to detain them from him who could alone be intitled to the Poſſeſſion of them; nothing of all this, without doubt, was thought neceſſary by the Author, or ſo accurate a Pen would have obliged the Reader, who muſt preſently after wonder exceedingly why the *Dutch* and our Court were convulſed, ſince an *unbyaſſed* Gentleman had the Cuſtody of the *Records*, which, by being in the *proper Hands*, could alone contribute to produce the Convulſion.

Yet, tho' theſe tremendous *Parchments* were in Hands not to be *corrupted* by Promiſes from L——r H——e, or *Gold* and Promiſes from A————n S——t, we ſhall find the *Dutch* and our Miniſtry driven to the very Verge of Deſpair, for fear the Lawyer ſhould not love *Gold*, or ſhould drop the

Ballance

Subſtance to catch at the *Shadow*.—How little and weak do Men in the higheſt Stations appear, ſometimes, when produced in their native Colours! behold how the *High and Mighty*, both at Home and Abroad, tremble at a Phantom.

'While this was in Agitation, and both 'Sides in doubt which ſhould ſucceed, both 'the *Dutch* and *Britiſh* M——y were at 'their *Wits Ends* for fear of the Event. 'They weighed every Circumſtance, can-'vaſſed every Meaſure, and puzzled and 'perplexed themſelves to no Purpoſe, *Re-'flexion worked on Reflexion, Thought on 'Thought*; they looked on one another 'like Men bewildered in a Storm (an Im-'provement of the late poignant *Simile* of 'the young Woman that had loſt a *Huſband* 'before ſhe had one) expecting every Mo-'ment the finiſhing Guſt, that muſt give 'them their *Quietus*,'——Nay, Sir; do not deſpair for all this melancholy painting. You ſhall find our Author can as readily extricate his *Actors*, as confound and perplex them; and he ſhall do this in a manner, which no other Writer in the World but himſelf would have undertaken or thought of. While the deſpairing *Hollanders* and our Miniſtry were in this diſtracted Condition, not knowing whether to hang or drown, behold how a Dawn of

Day broke in upon them to direct their Steps to Safety of Body and Mind.

— 'When ſuddenly a Glare of Light 'appeared from a Quarter they leaſt ex- 'pected, the Halcyon Day returned, and 'brightened all their Cares into Joy and 'Tranſport.'—How poetically expreſſed! *Brightened all their Cares!*—It would be a Pleaſure to the Curious, certainly, if the learned Author had here condeſcended to explain himſelf a little more amply. He might have told us whether theſe *Cares ſo brightened*, were filed bright, varniſhed with ſhining Paint, or ſtudded with ſmall Brilliant Diamonds. But ſuch ſmall Slips being pardonable in great Wits, let us return to our Author, who himſelf *brightens*, as he proceeds in his Narrative, in proportion to the Ruſt he files off the *Cares* of his Agents.

He not only told us the *Halcyon* Day was returned, but obligingly tells that it was brought on by the *only Man in the Nation the leaſt likely to contribute to the Quiet of the Miniſtry, or to ſet them right.* Let the World judge if I exaggerate in the Portraiture. 'They had luckily intimated to the 'K—g the Neceſſity of learning the Senti- 'ments of *the only Man* they feared would 'neceſſarily ſucceed on a Change, now ſeem- 'ingly approaching; they waited for ſome 'time with *Terrors* enough, when at length 'they

'they were told with a gracious Smile, that 'their Safety purely depended on the *Diſſo-* 'lution of the Parliament.'

Some have ſuppoſed, I hope invidiouſly, that all this was of the Author's own pure Invention; becauſe, ſay they, 'tis unlikely the late *Miniſter*, who always was, and is ſtill, cheriſhed by the P——e, would give *Advice* that ſhould put not only his royal Patron, but himſelf too, more in the Power of the Miniſtry than ever. He muſt be weaker and more ſelf-denying than he is deemed to be, to act thus a Part, which *Machiavel* would decry, and his very Enemies laugh at him for. But what of that and much more, which might be urged againſt, not only the Infallibility, but Impropriety of this long-winded Digreſſion. 'Tis enough that the learned Author had a Mind to put the *Dutch* and Miniſtry in a Fright, and to emblazon the Character of his Hero, the late Miniſter; and whoſe Buſineſs is it to find Fault with Men of Wit and Genius?

Therefore as he may think it to be none of mine, I ſhall take leave of him here, as to his *Pieces detachées, pour embellir & remplir*, to purſue him to the Main of his Subject, which appears to have been to *frighten the Miniſtry from all Thoughts of Peace for a Summer or two, that in the Interim, we may take the Chance of totally undoing the* Dutch

Dutch *and ourſelves, or ruining* France. Such is the ſage Advice of this public Cenſor, ſuch undoubtedly is the Scope and Purport of his Pamphlet, if it may be ſaid to have any, except celebrating the very ſhining Merit of a certain young *Repreſentative* of a very great City, and the *late Miniſter*, from both whom may be *Expectations* of different Complexions. But leſt he ſhould hold me inexcuſably ſtupid for not perceiving the Profundity of his Conception, as to the Nature and Extent of Government, I beg leave to trouble you with a few of his *ſelf-evident* Principles on the Subject. * 'Every 'Miniſter in a free State either proceeds on 'a *new Plan*, or moves by *none at all*. If 'on a new one, *the Chain is broke that ſhould* '*hold the State together*, and if on *none at* '*all*, then the *Spirit of the People governs*.'— For my part, though I perſuade myſelf there is ſomething very new and ſhining in all this, I readily own it beyond the ſcanty Meaſure of my poor Comprehenſion; therefore humbly leave the Diſcuſſion of its Sublimity to the *Literati* at *Tom*'s or *Child*'s, as well as of the Super-Elegancy of the harmonious Author on the Stupidity of Miniſterial Men. † 'It's a Pity that even the 'moſt deſperate Neceſſities of the State 'won't turn the Minds of *Miniſterial Men* 'to the reflecting on the impending Danger, 'nor

* Page 65. † Page 24.

'nor ſeek to ſhelter themſelves under 'the *hoſpitable Cover of evident Recti-* '*tude*,' &c.—But to the Author's principal Deſign.

To ſhew then his Drift at once in its ſtrongeſt Light, I ſhall quote his own Words as being undoubtedly more apt than any I could ſubſtitute in their Place. * 'I 'doubt not to ſee this War happily ended, 'with the entire Deſtruction of the *French* 'Commerce; which muſt be done, or as I 'have ſhewn before, all our Labour is in 'vain, our Debts are much too high to be 'paid by any other Means in Nature; and 'as they muſt be higher, there is no alter-'native left us, but *to have Peace on our own* '*Terms*, or become the Slaves of *France*.— 'In a Word, *one of us muſt now fall*, which, 'next under Heaven, is in our own Power 'to determine,' *&c.*

You may obſerve here, Sir, that old *Roman* Spirit which glowed in the Breaſt of thoſe renowned Republicans during the *Punick* Wars. *Delenda eſt Gallia.*——Britain *or* France *now muſt fall*; and we are here adviſed to run the Riſk of that tremendous *Fall*, to obtain a Peace *on our own Terms*.

But you are not to ſuppoſe our Author ſo much a Viſionary as to build upon Miracles only. I aſſure you he has his Pouch well ſtored

* Page 63, 64.

ſtored with *Hopes*, which you will find to be ſolidly grounded. * ' Our *Hopes*, in the ' mean time, are centered in the Prince of ' *Orange*'s getting the better of the *French* ' Party, and effectually rooting them out ' of the Army and Government; on the ' *Ruſſian* Forces coming timely in to our Aid; ' on our Naval Affairs being purſued with ' Spirit; and of our bringing ſuch an Army ' into the Field, as may be able to face the ' *French*.'

Here is the whole Chain of his political Strength for giving *France* the *Fall* he would perſuade us to attempt; but ſhould any of its Links give way, I apprehend it too obvious that we may receive the *Fall* inſtead of giving it?

It may be impracticable for the Prince of *Orange*, and perhaps not ſafe for him, to attempt ſo thorough and ſudden a Change in the Army and Government, as the Author contends for, while a powerful, ſucceſsful *French* Army is within the Territories, if not the Bowels, of the Republick. Here then may we be allowed to ſuppoſe that this firſt Link of his Chain may fail.--- Let us eſſay the next.

The *Ruſſians* may be prevented by domeſtick or neighbouring Diſtractions, either real or *pretended*; may be impeded in their March, *ſhould they march in earneſt*, either by

* Page 58.

by *Pruſſia* or *France*; may come too late to obſtruct ſuch Conqueſts of the Enemy, as may reach even the Vitals of the Republic; or, ſhould none of theſe Impediments intervene, *France* may ſtill be an over match for the Confederates in the Field, by means of *Swediſh*, *Pruſſian*, and other *German* Auxiliaries, or by a forced Augmentation of her native Troops, to make a dernier Effort. In either Caſe, what would become of *Holland*, ſhould this Link likewiſe fail? and, to our very great Sorrow, the Appearance is but too ſtrong, that it may.

The fourth Link of his Chain, I chuſe to conſider before the *third*, being naturally and more immediately connected with the *ſecond*, which related to the *Ruſſians*.—— If the *Ruſſians* ſhould not join us, there is no Appearance that *we can bring ſuch an Army into the Field, as may be able to face the Enemy*; and even if they ſhould, 'tis a doubt, a very great one, whether *France* might not out-number, and over-match us after the Junction: Therefore at beſt, this *third* Link of the ſanguine Author's Chain of *Hopes*, is but Conjectural. Would then a wiſe Man or a Friend to our preſent Eſtabliſhment, riſque the Fate of the Nation on a ſimple, I fear an untenable Conjecture? I appeal to your, and every Reader's Underſtanding, if the Author has not here evidently diſplay'd the *Hoof*, and confirmed himſelf to be of the *Winningtonian* Sect.

But as greateſt Streſs is laid throughout the whole Work, on the *third* Link of this imaginary Chain, that is, on our conquering and retaining all the *French Colonies*, before *France* overcame the *Dutch*, we will examine this Point ſeparately and more minutely. This is the more neceſſary, that the Author himſelf tells us that both we and the *Dutch* are inevitably undone, unleſs we ſucceed in the Attempt. But is it not probable that we are declaimed into a Deſire of making an Attempt of ſo ſickly a Contexture, in order to a Recovery of the *old Conſtitution.*

This important Conqueſt, according to this diſpatching Scribe, is to be made in one Summer, or our Miniſtry deſerve to be hanged.* 'Our naval Power, while the *Dutch* cover 'the Seas with Privateers, may finiſh the 'Deſtruction of the *French* Trade, with 'great Facility; and this, with due Attention, 'may be effected in *one Summer.*—— Again, 'if our Fleet cannot make ſuch a Peace as 'we want in *one Summer*, I know what 'ſome *People deſerve.*'

It were to be wiſhed the Author had told us in what particular Manner he would adviſe the attacking the *French* Settlements, that we may be the better able to judge of his military Skill. But ſince he has not thought proper to let his Readers be as wiſe as himſelf, for I will ſuppoſe he had formed a Scheme of the Conqueſt he intended; ſince, I ſay, he has not informed the Public, how the Conqueſt

* Page 30, 31.

queſt may be made, I ſhall endeavour to point out the Probability of our making none that can balance the Riſque, ſhould we make the Experiment, by continuing the War.

All Queen *Ann*'s War, we were as much Maſters as Sea as now, and we were Conquerors wherever the War was kindled on the Continent; yet we never attempted a Conqueſt of the *French* Colonies, but once of *Canada*, in which we failed, and not for Want of either Skill or Reſolution, ſo much as through a natural Impracticability that attends the Attempt of ſuch diſtant Conqueſts from a brave and the moſt experienced Nation in the World in the Art military. We took *Cape-Breton*; but had the *French* Miniſtry done their Duty, as they eaſily might, in ſending early and neceſſary Supplies to *Louisbourg*, we might have had ſufficient Reaſon to repent us of the Attempt. But are we preſumptuouſly to expect that the Court of *France* will be always as remiſs, and that we ſhall always have the like Succeſs?

I don't know what might have been the happy Conſequence, if the Blow had been immediately followed after the taking *Cape-Breton*; but if the moſt intelligent, in the Strength of both Nations, in that northern Part of *America*, may be credited, we have no chance of conquering *Quebeck*, without which all other Acquiſitions there would turn to little Account. So that in north *America*, the Chance of our not ſucceeding to root out

the *French* there, is at beſt, precarious, perhaps impracticable. And were it otherwiſe, I fear the Conqueſts of *France* in the *Netherlands* would render us very tractable on a Peace, on which Occaſion, I apprehend we ſhall be obliged to reſtore *Cape-Breton*, the only Conqueſt we have been able to make, ſince the War, with all our vaſt Superiority by Sea. —— We are next to examine the Feazibility of ſubduing the *French* Sugar Colonies, the only they have in *America*, except their Settlement on the River *Miſſiſſipi*, which I ſuppoſe the Author himſelf would not adviſe attempting.

The Principal of the *French* Sugar Settlements, are *Martinico* and *St. Domingo*, or *Hiſpaniola* divided between them and the *Spaniards*. To begin with the latter, I will take upon me to aſſert that the *French* alone on that Iſland, are able to raiſe 20000 effective Men, willing and able to defend their Properties againſt a foreign Invader. And we may naturally ſuppoſe that the *Spaniards* on the Iſland, would rather aid their *Catholic* Neighbours, than us Proteſtants. Beſides, it is no Secret, that the principal Harbours of that fine Iſland, particularly thoſe in the *Frnch* Poſſeſſion, are regularly and ſtrongly fortified.

In ſuch a Situation then, can we ſuppoſe the Conqueſt of this *French* Sugar Colony to be ſo practicable and eaſy, as this adventrous Writer would perſuade us it is? Is there not greater likelihood, that the *French*, from ſo populous a Colony, contiguous to *Jamaica*, may

may invade that Iſland of ours, than that we ſhould be able to ſubdue them?

The Probability of our ſucceeding againſt *Martinico* is ſtill ſtronger againſt us, if it be true, as I take upon me to ſay it is, that the *French* are able to arm 40000 good Men, in Defence of that valuable Iſland. There is not one acquainted with the vaſt Superiority of the *French* in thoſe Parts, that wonders not they had not invaded our *Leeward* Iſlands, ſince this War, and that ſcruples to own, they might, the two firſt Years of it, have ruin'd all thoſe Iſlands in a Fortnight. There is no Diſputing that they had Force enough at *Martinico* only, to do the Work; nor can they ever want it when inclined; or fear ſucceeding, if the Superiority of our naval Force, don't prove the Safety of our Fellow-Subjects in thoſe Parts.

The *French*, 'tis true, have a few more ſmall Sugar Iſlands, ſuch as *Guardeloupe* and *Mariegallante*; but they, if conquered, would be but a poor Equivalent for the Continuance of an expenſive and unſucceſsful War. And I am not clear, that we could ſubdue even theſe ſmall Colonies with all our Maritime Force, conſidering how populous and well fortified they are, the Weakneſs of our contiguous Colonies in Men capable of bearing Arms, and their Diſtance from this Center of our Force and Power.

Hence, Sir, you may perceive how very wide our Author ſhoots off the Mark, in ſuppoſing we

we ſhall be able in *one Summer*, to ruin the *French* Trade, by the Conqueſt of their Colonies. We might indeed in a Courſe of many Years, if the *French* ſhould ſleep as they have of late Years, in regard to their Marine, reduce their Sugar Iſlands to great Diſtreſs, by obſtructing the Intercourſe between them and their Mother-Country. But would ſuch a ſlow Reduction, or rather the *Hopes* of a Reduction, compenſate for our ill Succeſs on the Continent in the mean time? And are we ſure that the *French* will always ſtand in their own Light and neglect their Marine, as they have done of late, to extend their Trade? Beſides, were we able to beat them out of their whole Trade during the War, we ſhould but raiſe ſo many more Enemies, ſo much more powerful Rivals, who might, by applying all their Attention to their Marine and employing all their Seamen to annoy us, become an Over-Match for a Nation that muſt neceſſarily employ the greater Number of our Seafaring Men, in the carrying on an extenſive Commerce.

Our thoughtleſs *Monitor* inſiſts that we beat the *French* out of all their Trade, or we are undone. I have endeavoured to ſhew above that the Odds are many againſt us, that we could not if we would, conquer the *French American* Colonies, and that if we did, we ſhould be obliged on a Peace, to reſtore them all. How do you think the *Dutch* would reliſh the Detention of their Barrier, and even

of

of their conquer'd Territories, by *France*, becauſe we ſhould refuſe reſtoring our Conqueſts upon her in *America?* Nor ſhould we have the popular Cry leſs againſt us in behalf of the Courts of *Vienna* and *Turin*, ſhould we pretend to retain ſuch Conqueſts, which muſt neceſſarily be at the Expence of our Allies.

The only Trade we could have any Chance of getting out of the Hands of the *French* intirely, is that to the *Eaſt-Indies*; but even this fair Proſpect may vaniſh, ſhould our late great Armament to thoſe Seas meet with bad Weather, Sickneſs, Shipwreck, or many other croſs Accidents and Caſualties, to which naval Expeditions are liable, particularly thoſe at ſo vaſt a diſtance.

You ſee, Sir, that even this Conqueſt, the likelieſt of all we can make on the *French*, is far from being ſo real as may be imagined by thoſe who view only the fairer Side of the Picture. And it has this alſo in common with Conqueſts in *America*, could we make any, that we ſhould be obliged to part from them, unleſs we could beat Count *Saxe* beyond the *Loire* and *Garrone*.

As for the general *European* Trade of *France*, which is the neceſſary Conſequence of her Climate, Situation, Products, Oeconomy, Skill and Induſtry of her Inhabitants, the Author has not thought fit to explain himſelf, whether we ſhall continue the War till we beat her out of it, or indulge her with it, becauſe it would be impoſſible to wreſt it from

from her, unleſs we ſhould be adroit enough to perſuade the *Turks*, *Spaniards*, *Italians*, *Danes*, *Swedes*, *Germans*, *Poles*, *Ruſſians*, &c. neither to eat, drink, or wear any of the Products or Manufactures of that Country; or if theſe ſeveral Nations were not to be perſuaded, that we ſhould fag them into a Compliance.

To be ſerious, my dear Friend, how thoughtleſs muſt this ſanguine Writer and his mercantile *Chum* be, if they were in earneſt in their vehement Exhortations to continue the War, till we could beat *France* out of all her Commerce? How thoughtleſs ſhould we be if we had ſwallowed the Bait on the Credit of Scribes that ſeek our Ruin to promote their ſecret Schemes? And how heedleſs and unjuſt would our Miniſtry be to continue the War, if any tolerable Peace can be obtained, in order to hunt after chimerical Conqueſts and Trades, which if poſſeſſed, we ſhould moſt certainly be obliged to part from? But 'tis to be hoped the Nation are wiſer than to be thus lured to their Undoing by Declaimers, that are no leſs Strangers to the Subject they pretend to treat of, than to that Truth and Candor which warm the Patriot's Breaſt.

It is obvious to a Demonſtration, that the Performance under my preſent Conſideration, was calculated for depreciating and perplexing the preſent Miniſtry, to make way for a new, at the Head of which, the Author would wiſh to ſee the *late Miniſter* placed. This being

being the evident Purport of the Piece, it will be proper to conſider it with ſome Attention. As for the *ſecret Views* of the Author or Authors, in favour of *W———n's old Conſtitution*, though they appear to me almoſt equally evident, from the Conſequence of replacing the late adventrous M——r at the Head of Affairs, I will however chuſe to leave you yourſelf to draw what Concluſion you think may be truly founded on the whole Performance taken collectively.

You muſt neceſſarily perceive the Scope and Tendency of the Author to be the plunging your Country into inextricable Difficulties, by the Continuance of a ſucceſsleſs War, grown already much too burthenſome for us: Nor is it leſs obvious that he would thruſt out thoſe whom he ſuſpects to be pacifickly inclined as foreſeeing the impendent Ruin, in order to make way for *Him* that had brought all our preſent Calamities upon us, and who is the moſt likely Man in the Nation to compleat our Deſtruction, by precipitating us from one ruinous Meaſure to another, till, on Mr. *W———n's* Plan, we ſhall be glad to do our *beſt Work*, as he calls treading back and ripping up the boaſted glorious Work of our Fathers in 1688.

The Author himſelf ſcruples not to own that the *Dutch* are on the Verge of Deſtruction, and tacitly confeſſes, as he neceſſarily muſt, that our Ruin is blended with their Fall.—' * On their (*French*) being poſſeſſed

* Page 14, 15.

'of *Holland*, the whole Syſtem of Affairs
'will take quite a new Turn, either the
'Lovers of Liberty will drown their Coun-
'try, and retire hither; or, if the *French*
'Party be more prevalent, the *French* will
'come into Poſſeſſion of that rich Maritime
'Country, and therewith acquire an Addi-
'tion to their Sugar Trade by having *Suri-*
'*nam*, and it's highly probable the whole
'*Eaſt-Indies*.'—Again, 'I am verily per-
'ſuaded, that ſomething of this Nature is
'nearly approaching, whether we *continue*
'*the War*, or agree to a *ſhameful Peace*, &c.'

You ſee here, Sir, a tacit Avowal that the Continuance of the War may be attended with infinite Danger to our preſent Conſtitution, yet the Drift of the Author's whole Book is to lure the Nation into a Reliſh for the ſucceſsleſs Purſuit. Every Peace, with this Scribe, muſt be *ſhameful*, that does not render *France dependant* on *England*; therefore, as ſuch a *Dependance* is morally impracticable, as Matters are now ſituated, 'tis manifeſt the Author muſt have ſome ſecret View in urging ſo unſeaſonably, and ardently the Continuance of the War; and what other can that deep-laid Deſign be but the throwing the Nation into ſo great Confuſion and Deſpair, as that, to get rid of our Miſeries, we ſhall be ripe for any Change that might give us a Chance for Relief.

Whom then, my dear Friend, would you chuſe to truſt with the Direction of public

public Affairs, the *Man* that had wantonly plunged the Nation into all our preſent Difficulties, that had brought all their preſent Diſtreſſes on the *Dutch*, and who, if he had Influence, would perpetuate their and our Perplexities; or thoſe, who would put the ſpeedieſt and ſafeſt End poſſible to a War, which, if as ſucceſsleſs as for the Time paſt, muſt, by its Continuance, inevitably ruin the *Dutch*, and probably bring on the Diſſolution of our preſent cheriſhed Conſtitution?

That the late M——r brought the preſent *French* War upon us, is beyond all Controverſy; or, at leaſt, that our Conduct during his Miniſtry had provoked *France* to declare againſt us. It will be as little controverted, that the ſame Conduct had brought the War into the *Netherlands* againſt the Opinion and Conſent of the *Dutch*, who are now reduced to Deſpair by that precipitate Meaſure.

Again, 'tis notorious that the ſame *Man* preſided over our Councils, when the Mediation of the King of *Pruſſia* was rejected at *Hanau* in 1743, by which Means, that Prince was cooled and weaned from any Attachment he might have had before that for our Court, and an honourable and permanent Tranquillity was prevented.

The ſame Miniſter likewiſe concluded the Treaty of *Worms* the ſame Year, the flagrant Injuſtice of which, forced the *Ge-*

noeſe into the Alliance of *France* and *Spain*, than which Junction with our Enemies, nothing could have contributed more to ſtrengthen the *Bourbon*, and weaken the *Auſtrian* Intereſt in *Italy*. The fatal Conſequences of that miſtaken Treaty was nervouſly and prophetically pointed out by an accurate Pen *, ſoon after its Concluſion; and time has ſince abundantly evinced the Rectitude of the judicious Author's Conjectures. Yet this is the very Meaſure, for which we ſee that *Miniſter* incenſed by this partial Scribe, and by a daily Writer, no more the *Fool* than him.

Let the Scene now be changed to thoſe at preſent in the Direction of our Affairs. There was no recalling immediately what had been done by the late M——r. He had ſhuffled and cut, and dealt out the Cards ſo, that his Succeſſors had no Option left but that of playing the Game the beſt they could, in Hopes ſome Change, Death, or other lucky Accident Abroad, might intervene to accelerate the putting a ſafe and honourable End to the Conteſt. They have tried the Fortune of War with Courage; they have waited for fortunate Events with Steadineſs; but neither having anſwered their Hopes, what ought they to do? How are they to act when involved in a burthenſome, unpropitious War? Ought they to continue it at the Hazard of ruining their Allies and their own Country, or put a Period

* Free Thoughts on the Treaty of *Worms*, &c.

Period to it on the beſt Terms that can be obtained before the Enemy's Conqueſts reach the Vitals of the *Dutch*?

Surely, my Friend, the Eligibility of the alternative is too obvious to need Argument. If we continue the War, and it prove unſucceſsful, the *Dutch* will be undone, and we muſt be buried in their Ruin. The Conqueſt of the *French* Colonies, and the Deſtruction of their whole Commerce, is a mere Chimera, as I have ſhewn before. Could the Conqueſt be made, our Allies would, and muſt be obliged to join ſo far with the Enemy, as to exact a Reſtitution of whatever might be wreſted from the *French* in the new World. It would be impoſſible to make Peace without ſuch Reſtitution, unleſs *France* be driven out of all her Conqueſts in the *Netherlands*, which may be rather wiſhed for, than relied on. Yet ſee how differently this Writer pretends to judge of the Matter.

* ' In this I ſee not any rational alterna-
' tive, nor can conceive on what Terms it's
' poſſible to make Peace, but ſuch as muſt
' be attended with inevitable Ruin.'—This inconſiſtent Author argued to the ſame Purport in his *State of the Nation* for laſt Year; and yet ſince his writing that incendiary Piece, we have had ſuch Overtures of Peace made to us by *France*, as might be embraced even in a ſucceſsful War. What could be wiſhed for more, in the then State of

* Page 15.

of the War, than *for* France *to offer reſtoring all her Conqueſts, in Caſe a moderate Settlement ſhould be agreed to for Don* Philip *in* Italy, *and that a ſmall Diſtrict in the Dutchy of* Luxemburg, *contiguous to the Territories of* France *on that Side, ſhould be yielded to that Crown?*

Theſe are ſuch Preliminaries as I preſume to aſſert were offered by *France*, and repeated. And pray, why may not a Peace founded on ſuch Preliminaries be made without being attended with *inevitable Ruin*, the Conſequence, according to this Author, of making any Peace, till we ſhall have conquered the *French* Colonies, and poſſeſſed ourſelves of all their Trade? But herein eſpecially appears the Author's *Secret Views.* With him, our *Ruin is inevitable* if Peace be made; and why? but that he ſuppoſes, and very juſtly, that the Continuance of the War muſt ſo perplex us, that we ſhall plunge into any Meaſure that promiſes any Relief, or even a Change of Miſery, which is ſome Alleviation in Pain.

But our Miniſtry, who have no View but to the Honour and Happineſs of their Country and Prince, will, 'tis to be hoped, entertain other Notions concerning Peace and War, in a Conjuncture the moſt critical and perilous that has ever been known. And if they are to blame for any Part of their paſt Conduct, 'tis, that they did not cloſe with the Propoſals of *France*, before ſhe invaded the Territories of *Holland*; and that they

they abetted an Attack on the *Genoese*, a neutral Nation, which brought on the Invasion of *France*. For tho' she may have made, or listened, to Overtures since; nay, tho' she and *Spain* may have complimented us with the sending Emissaries Home to us to treat of Peace, yet I cannot persuade myself that the *French* are as tractable now, as before the Conquest of *Bergen-op-zoom*. And still, I am of Opinion, 'tis our Interest to listen to an Accommodation on the best Terms that can be obtained.

If I could suppose that the slipping so favourable, I may say, happy an Occasion of putting an End to the War, was owing to the *Tenaciousness* or Corruption of any Men in Power, I should as readily give them up, as I do the late M——r, for rejecting the Offers of the last Emperor, at *Hanau*. But I will hope the Error lies *elsewhere*, for the Sake of *Englishmen*; and that, for the Sake of *England*, no *Interest* will be more regarded or cherished than hers, in any Negociation that may be now on the Anvil, or may hereafter be set on foot.

Before I take Leave of you, or quit this Writer, so extolled and supported by the *Servants* and *Dependents* of a *Personage*, as beloved as he is wise, good, and eminent, I cannot, in Gratitude to the Royal *Youth* who commanded for us and our Allies Abroad, but animadvert on the Indecency of this Scribe in regard to that illustrious Hero, no less conspicuous for military Skill than personal

perſonal Bravery. * ' When the Duke of *Marlborough* ' commanded, the common Soldiers ſignalized themſelves ' in a diſtinguiſhed Manner, not only as they depended on ' the *Judgment* of their General, but as they knew he was ' always provided to carry any Point he determined on.'

This needleſs Panegyric on the *Skill* and *Judgment* of the Duke of *Marlborough* needs no Comment. The ſcandalous Uſe deſigned to be made of it, and the Reflection intended to be fix'd by it, are too obvious to eſcape your Penetration. I ſhall therefore leave the Chaſtiſement of a Writer, that thus dares tacitly reflect on the *Judgment* of the moſt promiſing military Genius of the Age, to your, and the Reader's Diſcretion, aſſuring myſelf you will ſtill have a View to his *ſecret Byaſs* to *W———n's old Conſtitution*, in paſſing Sentence upon him.

If you ſhould ſtill doubt that he is not the Incendiary I would repreſent him, and for the dark Purpoſe I have hinted, I hope you will be convinced by reflecting on the following Portraiture of *England* lately drawn by the ſame *Pen*, wherein you will find us ſatyrized for a Conduct, which in his *State of the Nation*, he recommends with the utmoſt Ardour and Vehemence.

† ' *Great Britain*, I conceive, is in a Situation very par- ' ticular and diſtinct from what either the Ancients knew, ' or the Moderns are well acquainted with. We are in the ' Character of Balance-Maſters-General, to fight every Bo- ' dy's Battles, and arbitrate every Nation's Difference; ' no War ever laſts long but what we have a Hand in; nor ' any Peace made where we are not the principal contracting ' Parties; ſo that, like *Auguſtus Cæſar*, we either give the ' World Reſt; or, like the *Roman* Senate, let all the Nati- ' ons know what a happy Talent we have at Fighting. The ' Houſe of *Auſtria* and *Sardinia*, the *Seven United Provinces*, ' and the *Empire*, (and more eſpecially *H———r*, he might ' have ſaid) are all under our expreſs Care and Guardianſhip; ' and when we cannot defend them by our own natural ' Power, we fetch Succours from the remoteſt Regions; ' happy in that, we always carry our Point at laſt; but ' much happier in always having a Point to carry.'

Could you imagine the ſame Pen drawing this Picture of his Country, and at the ſame time, declaiming her into a Continuance of an inauſpicious, ſucceſsleſs War? By this little Finger you may judge of the *Hercules*, who has brought this Addreſs upon you, *From Yours*, &c.

* Page 19. † *Fool*, No. 239.

F I N I S.